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Beyond “justification”: dimensions of epistemic evaluation 
By William P Alston 
Cornell University Press, February 2005, Pp. xv + 256. ISBN 0-8014-4291-5. Hbk 
Price Hbk. £24.50 ($45.00) 
 
The primary aim of this book is, ‘to explore and explicate the modes of epistemic 
evaluation of belief and to develop a better framework for understanding and 
using them than is prevalent in the present state of the subject’(6). The present 
state of epistemology has, in Alston’s view, a variety of different factions arguing 
about what exactly constitutes justified belief. Some argue that justification 
requires that the believer have cognitive access to or even knowledge of the fact 
that the belief is based on good reasons; while others argue that the belief’s being 
formed by a reliable process is enough. Some argue that the believer must be able 
to defend the probable truth of the belief; while others argue that the belief must 
be part of a coherent set of beliefs or the result of an exercise of intellectual 
virtue. The list could go on.  
In light of this pervasive controversy, the central thesis of this book is 
metaphilosophical and normative. Picking up on a theme stressed in his paper 
‘Epistemic Desiderata’ (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 1993), 
Alston suggests that there is no fact of the matter about what constitutes 
epistemic justification. This is why he thinks epistemology should move ‘Beyond 
“Justification”’—that is to say, beyond the search for ‘the unique, epistemically 
crucial property of beliefs picked out by “justified”’(22). Once we reject the 
‘justificationist’ approach to understanding the epistemic evaluation of belief, we 
shall be, according to Alston, better equipped to articulate and understand the 
interrelations between a variety of different epistemic desiderata whose 
proponents have, until now, struggled in vain in an all-or-nothing competition for 
the best account of epistemic justification. 
In addition to making this metaphilosophical normative point, this book 
also begins post-justificationist project of categorizing, explicating, and relating 
the various epistemic desiderata. Fortunately, the labors of the justificationist 
project were not completely in vain. This is because each separate account of 
justification can now be viewed as suggesting a possible epistemic desideratum. 
Not faced with the task of proving that this or that good-making feature of a belief 
is what solely constitutes justification, it is open to us to recognize all good-
making features as epistemically valuable. Moreover, at least some of the 
arguments for and against various conceptions of epistemic justification can now 
be recast in a more constructive light as helpful attempts to articulate the fine-
structure of the relations between various epistemic desiderata. This is why 
Alston often refers to his approach to epistemic evaluation as a ‘pluralist’ or ‘Let a 
thousand flowers bloom’ approach to epistemic evaluation. Nonetheless, it is not 
a libertarian approach. For Alston clearly thinks that some epistemic desiderata 
are more important than others; and there is one class of proposed desiderata 
that he thinks fails to provide genuine desiderata at all.  
The five general classes of possible epistemic desiderata he identifies in 
chapter 3 are (in order of theoretical importance): (i) truth, (ii) truth-conducive 
features of beliefs, (iii) features of belief favorable to the discrimination and 
formation of true beliefs, (iv) features of systems of beliefs that are among the 
goals of cognition, (v) deontological features of beliefs. According to Alston, 
treating truth as the most basic epistemic desideratum is definitive of the 
‘epistemic point of view’. He writes, ‘We evaluate something epistemically…when 
we judge it to be more or less good or bad from the epistemic point of view, that 
is, for the attainment of epistemic purposes’(29). And, according to him, these 
purposes are to be gleaned from the goals of human cognition. He writes, 
‘epistemology consists of a critical reflection on human cognition. And the 
evaluative aspect of epistemology involves an attempt to identify ways in which 
the conduct and the products of our cognitive activities can be better or worse vis-
à-vis the goals of cognition’(ibid.). However, in the end, he thinks there is really 
just one primary goal of cognition—truth. He writes, ‘Along with many other 
epistemologists I suggest that the primary function of cognition in human life is 
to acquire true rather than false beliefs about matters that are of interest or 
importance to us’(ibid.). 
 On Alston’s approach, this focus on truth provides the primary resource 
for evaluating the relative priority and nature of the different desiderata. So, 
naturally, truth-conducive features of beliefs—group (ii)—come out as the next 
most important class of desiderata in Alston’s view. These are features of a belief 
such as the belief’s being based on adequate grounds, the belief’s being formed by 
a reliable process, the belief’s being formed by the exercise of an intellectual 
virtue, etc. But in all cases, the relevant notion—i.e. adequate ground, reliability, 
intellectual virtue—must be understood in terms of truth-conduciveness, in order 
for the correlative desideratum to count as a genuinely epistemic desideratum. 
 By contrast, the desiderata of group (iii) come out as correlatively less 
important because their connection to truth is more indirect. These are classically 
internalist features of a belief such as the believer’s cognitive access to or 
knowledge of the adequacy of the reasons for the belief and the believer’s ability 
to carry out a successful defense of the belief’s probable truth. Alston wants to 
recognize these as genuine epistemic desiderata, but not desiderata as important 
as truth and truth-conduciveness. Along a different axis of evaluation, we can 
evaluate whole systems of beliefs for things such as explanatory power, 
understanding, coherence, and systematicity. These are the group (iv) desiderata. 
Again, Alston wants to recognize these as genuine epistemic desiderata, but not 
desiderata as important as the other groups. 
 Before moving on to the final group of possible desiderata and Alston’s 
argument that they are not in fact genuine desiderata, I want to register a worry 
about Alston’s method for evaluating the relative priority of the various genuine 
epistemic desiderata. Since this book pioneers the epistemic desiderata approach, 
while Alston may have opponents to the approach, he doesn’t yet have opponents 
who agree in approach but disagree with the details of the resulting account of 
the structural priorities of the various desiderata. However, imagine an opponent 
of this sort who argues as follows:  
Group (ii) desiderata such as adequacy of grounds and reliability are 
certainly important, but, when it comes to epistemically evaluating human 
believers, group (iii) desiderata such as a believer’s ability to defend her 
belief in the face of legitimate challenge is more important, because it is 
only when this is true that it the believer will have reached the end of 
inquiry—i.e. knowledge. Or, if you like, group (iv) desiderata such as a 
belief system’s explanatory power and coherence are more important since 
understanding the world we live in is more important than collecting a 
hodgepodge of disconnected true beliefs. 
As we have seen, Alston thinks this is wrong because he thinks that it is truth 
rather than knowledge or understanding that is the central cognitive goal 
definitive of the epistemic point of view. Maybe that is right, but now imagine a 
new kind of critical pluralist who diagnoses this standoff by suggesting that there 
is actually no fact of the matter about whether it is truth, knowledge, or 
understanding that is the distinctive cognitive goal. To be sure, they are desirable 
from an epistemic point of view. But this sort of pluralist critic will argue that 
debate about which one is definitive of the epistemic point of view is spurious, 
and we should therefore move beyond thinking of the ‘definitive cognitive goal’ 
and ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’ here too. The point I want to make is not 
(although I think this is true) that this pluralist position about definitive cognitive 
goals is correct; rather the point I want to make is that the same sort of 
considerations that motivate Alston’s pluralist response to the debate about what 
constitutes epistemic justification would seem to militate against his totalitarian 
view of what constitutes the cognitive goal definitive of the epistemic point of 
view. 
 Now, whatever the relative priority and importance of group (ii), (iii), and 
(iv) desiderata turns out to be, Alston thinks there is a class of apparent 
desiderata that we should reject as genuine desiderata. Within the justificationist 
framework, some have proposed a deontological conception of epistemic 
justification. The rough idea is that a belief is justified just in case holding it is 
epistemically permissible or one is not epistemically to blame for doing so. 
Deploying his strategy of transposing previous attempts to identify the unique, 
epistemically crucial property of beliefs picked out by ‘justified’ into proposals 
about what is desirable from the epistemic point of view, Alston uses this and 
related ideas to generate putative deontological desiderata—group (v). These are: 
(a) the belief is held permissibly, (b) the belief is formed and held responsibly, 
and (c) the causal ancestry of the belief does not contain violations of intellectual 
obligations. 
 Alston argues that none of these are genuine epistemic desiderata. In his 
view, (b) is effectively ambiguous between (a) and (c); so, whichever way we 
understand it, it is taken care of by his arguments against (a) and (c). He argues 
that (a) is rendered incoherent by the truth of doxastic involuntarism, and (c) 
isn’t a genuinely epistemic desideratum because it lacks an appropriate 
connection to truth. I found both of these arguments to be weak, so I shall 
conclude by challenging them in turn. 
Picking up on the major theme of his paper ‘The Deontological Conception 
of Epistemic Justification’ (Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 1988), Alston again 
argues that we do not have effective voluntary control over our beliefs. There are 
several things we say that makes it seem as if we have effective voluntary control. 
For instance, we talk of ‘making up our minds’ and ‘weighing evidence in pursuit 
of a decision about what to believe’. However, Alston attempts to explain away 
these and other ways of speaking. He grants that we may have indirect voluntary 
control over our beliefs, much like we have indirect voluntary control over our 
blood pressure, but, according to Alston, this is not enough for ‘effective 
voluntary control’. His argument against effective voluntary control over our 
beliefs consists simply in asking us to try to exercise it: ‘Can you, at this moment, 
start to believe that the Roman Empire is still in control of western Europe, just 
by deciding to do so?’(63) Of course we cannot. 
 This is significant because Alston thinks it implies that beliefs cannot be 
proper objects of deontological evaluation. This is because ‘By the time-honored 
principle “Ought implies can”, one can be obliged to do A only if one has an 
effective choice as to whether to do A”(60). However, it is surprising that, at this 
crucial juncture in his argument, Alston does not engage with the many critical 
responses to his 1988 article. In direct response to Alston, Richard Feldman has 
suggested that epistemic oughts are like role-oughts, such as ‘A teacher ought to 
explain things clearly’, which do not, in general, imply cans (see his ‘The Ethics of 
Belief,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 2000). Matthais Steup 
has argued that ability to intend effectively to believe is not necessary for doxastic 
freedom and it is only doxastic freedom that is necessary for deontological 
evaluation (see his ‘Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology,’ Acta Analytica, 15, 
2000). David Owens has distinguished between will-based freedom and 
judgment-based freedom and argued that there is a perfectly cogent sense in 
which we are responsible for our beliefs even though we enjoy neither sort of 
freedom with respect to them (see his Reason without Freedom, London: 
Routledge 2000.) Hilary Kornblith has argued that doxastic oughts are derivative 
of epistemic ideals which can transcend particular agents capacities (see his 
‘Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism,’ in Virtue Epistemology: 
Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Fairweather, A. and L. Zagzebski, 
eds. New York; Oxford, Oxford University Press). Nishi Shah has argued that 
decisional control is not necessary for doxastic voluntarism (see his ‘Clearing 
Space for Doxastic Voluntarism.’ The Monist 85, 2002). And Sharon Ryan has 
challenged both the general ‘Ought implies can’ principle and its application to 
epistemic oughts with a variety of interesting counterexamples (see her ‘Doxastic 
Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief’ Philosophical Studies, 114, 2003). This is 
not the place to evaluate the effectiveness of these responses to Alston’s 1988 
paper, but I must say that I found it surprising that he repeats the same argument 
in this book without so much as mentioning any of these. 
 Moreover, there is a distinction that can help to diagnose why we do not 
have effective and direct voluntary control over our beliefs but nonetheless seem 
to say things such as ‘One ought to believe that the earth is not flat.’ This is 
Sellars’ distinction between rules of action and rules of criticism (or, if you like, 
‘ought-to-do’s and ‘ought-to-be’s) (see Sellars’ ‘Language as Thought and as 
Communication,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29, 1969). What 
Alston’s argument for doxastic involuntarism shows, in effect, is that believing is 
not an action in the strict sense. However, as Sellars shows, it is not only actions 
that are proper subjects of deontological evaluation but also certain ways of 
being. Sellars’ leading examples are rules of criticism that might be relevant in 
moral and linguistic education of our children, such as ‘One ought to feel 
sympathy for the bereaved’ and ‘One ought to be disposed to respond with ‘red’ in 
response to red things under appropriate prompting’. Although deployed in a 
rather different context, the point of Sellars’ distinction is that there are perfectly 
coherent deontological evaluations which do not trade on the subject of the 
evaluation having effective direct voluntary control over whether she is the way 
she ought to be. So, until Alston provides some further response to the criticisms 
of his 1988 article and argues that deontological desiderata such as (a) cannot be 
plausibly thought of as generating epistemic rules of criticism, his rejection of 
deontological desiderata is premature. 
 Regarding (c)—i.e. the putative epistemic desideratum that the causal 
ancestry of the belief does not contain violations of intellectual obligations—
Alston argues that, while this may be a cognitive desideratum when properly 
understood, it is no epistemic desideratum. This is because it is not appropriately 
related to the goal of truth. His argument for thinking that it is not related to the 
goal of truth is complex, but the crux of it is that there is no necessary connection 
between meeting intellectual obligations in forming a belief and that belief being 
probably true. It seems that there are all sorts of counterexamples where one 
does everything that could be reasonably expected—one proceeds with an open 
mind, one double checks all of the calculations, one weighs all of the evidence 
appropriately, etc.—but, nonetheless, one ends up with a false belief through 
brute unluckiness, cognitive limitation, or something else. 
 There are two responses to this argument. First, even if Alston is right that 
there are breaks in the link between truth and meeting one’s intellectual 
obligations, that does not show that all beliefs which have (c) are no more likely 
to be true than those that do not. After all, in cases where one does not proceed 
with an open mind, double check all of the calculations, weigh all of the evidence 
appropriately, it seems that one will be much more likely to form a false belief. 
But, second, why does it matter if (c) is appropriately related to truth, if beliefs 
that have this feature are anyway more desirable than beliefs that do not? 
Alston’s response will surely be that such beliefs may be more desirable in some 
sense, but they are not more desirable from the ‘epistemic point of view’ because 
that point of view is defined by the central cognitive goal of truth. However, we 
have already seen why this response is not very satisfactory. Insofar as we follow 
Alston in his pluralist view of epistemic desiderata, it is far from clear why we 
should follow him in his correlatively totalitarian view that it is only the goal of 
truth which constitutes the ‘epistemic point of view’.  
So, while I commend the anti-justificationist pluralism towards epistemic 
desiderata that this book advances, I find the arguments Alston pursues in 
exploring the relative priority and genuineness of various putative epistemic 
desiderata to be far from convincing. 
 
University of Edinburgh      Matthew Chrisman 
